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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction in this
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2 as this matter is
an appeal from a final Judgment and Order in a civil matter from
the Third Judicial District Court In and Fpr Salt Lake County,
State of Utah. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to
the Court of Appeals pursuant to the authority contained in the
Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2(4) in an Orc^er dated January 15,
1988. This is a consolidated appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASff
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from Findings Of Fapt And Conclusions Of
Law And Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable District Court Judge
Timothy R. Hanson presiding, ordering Judgment for DefendantRespondent and assessing costs against Plaintiffs-Appellants.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEblNGS
On September

11, 1987 the Court entered its Amended

Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, and Judgment. On October 8,
1987 the Honorable Judge Hanson entered an Order extending the
time for filing a Notice of Appeal for Appellant Ronald K.
Neilsen, dba, Marina Mechanics Enterprises, hereinafter referred
to as "Neilsen" to November 9, 1987, upon such date "Neilsen
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filed his appeal Appellant Astro Steel Corporation, hereinafter
referred to as "Astro" filed its Notice of Appeal on October 9,
1987. The cases were transferred to the Court of Appeals and
Consolidated by Order of the Court. Extensions were granted in
which to file required documents thereafter, including the briefs
on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The action appealed from arises out of the construction of
a marina on Callville Bay, Lake Mead, Nevada. The DefenfdantRespondent, Forever Living Products, hereinafter referred to as
"FLP", is the owner. Marinas Internationale, hereinafter referred
to as "MI", not a party to the action due to a Chapter 11,
converted to a Chapter 7 in Virginia, was the general contractor,
becoming such on or about December 14, 1984. (see Record on
Appeal, page numbers 000606-000615, pg. 000608, para. 5 ) .

On

or

about

March

1,

1985

"MI" entered

into

an

"Installation Contract" with "Neilsen". (see Record on Appeal,
page numbers 000606-000615, pg. 000608, para. 8). Other pertinent
facts relative to this appeal are as set forth in the Record on
Appeal, page numbers 000606-000615.
Other pertinent, material facts not set forth in the
Record on Appeal, page numbers 000606-000615 are as follows:
(a) "Astro" was a materialman only and had no direct
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contractual obligations to either "MI" or "#LP". (see Transcript
dated June 10, 1987, hereinafter referred to as Tr. 2, pages 135147).
(b) "Astro1s" contract was with "Neilsen" only and was to
supply steel structural material only, and such contract was
entered into after "Neilsen" contracted with "MI", (see Tr. 2,
pages 135-147).
(c) The contract between "FLP" and "MI" and the contract
between

"FLP" and

"Neilsen" both contemplated

third-party

beneficiaries, (see Record on Appeal, page numbers 000606-00615).

(d) The Complaint in Intervention o£ "Astro" clearly sets
forth a claim in negligence for the negligent payilfcnt to "MI" by
"FLP".

(see Record on Appeal, page numbers 000096-000102,

specifically page 000098, para. 8 ) .
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented on appeal in behalf of "Astro" are
as follows:
(a) Whether "Astro" was damaged by the negligence of
"FLP", other than economically, in "FLP's" administration of its
contract, and consequently, whether the Hbnorable Judge Hanson
erred in his dismissal of the negligence cause of action pursuant
to Defendant-Respondent's Rule 41B motion, (see Ruling of Judge
Hanson dated June 16, 1987).
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(b) Whether "Astro", as a materialman only, "steps into
the shoes" of the contractor, or subcontractor, and is subject to
all defenses

"FLP" could raise as against a contractor or

subcontractor, and consequently, whether the Honorable Judge
Hanson erred in his ruling that granted no cause of action on
"Astrofs" third-party beneficiary theory.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT I
Appellant "Astro" adduced evidence at trial, prior to
Judge Hanson's ruling on Defendant's Rule 41B Motion, that
sustains a finding that "FLP" was negligent in the making of
payments to the contractor, "MI". Such payments were in breach of
a duty to intended third-party beneficiaries contemplated under
the "FLP"/"MI" contract, and such breach was the proximate cause
of damage to "Astro" in other than economic ways. The most
significant non-economic injury/damage to "Astro" was the loss of
its bonding capacity as a result of "FLP's" failure to retain
payment until verification of delivery of materials to site was
made. As a direct and proimate result of "FLP's" failure to
properly make payments on the contract to "MI", "Astro" was a
defendant in a lawsuit and consequent judgment from the supplier
of the steel materials that "Astro" delivered to "FLP's" site.
That judgment, because "Astro" did not receive the money to pay
over to their supplier, caused "Astro" to lose its contractor's
bond with the resultant loss of business, inability to bid the
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normal kinds of jobs they had been bidding, with resultant loss
in profits. Judge Hanson's Rule 41B Motion Ruling on the
negligence issue cut short the ability of "Astro" to present
evidence of those lost profits and effect of loss of bonding.
"Astro" believes that the Complaint in Intervention clearly sets
forth a negligence claim for negligent payment by "FLP". The
Honorable Judge Hanson's Ruling, based upon his reading of the
Complaint in Intervention that there was not a cause set forth
for negligent payment, precluded "Astro" from further presenting
non-economic loss evidence. Such Ruling was an error, and the
I
case should be remanded for further evidence on the negligent
payment issue.
ARGUMENT II
Appellant

"Astro" was a materialman only, providing

materials to the job site and nothing more. A legal distinction
in the cases on third-party beneficiary

is drawn between

subcontractors and materialmen, where the materialmen provide
only materials and no subcontract work or labor. Materialmen, in
cases such as this,

do not

"step into the shoes" of the

contractor or subcontractor for all purposes. "Astro" believes
the Honorable Judge Hanson erred in the law as to third-party
beneficiary under the circumstances of this case by failing to
acknowledge the distinction in the law regarding materialmen who
provide only materials.
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ARGUMENT
I
"Astro" lost its bonding capacity as a direct result of
the "FLP's" failure to adhere to its contractual provisions of
withholding payments to "MI" until after materials were verified
as delivered to the construction site, (see "MI"/"FLP" contract,
D-40,

paragraphs

20.1

and

23

regarding

payments

to

subcontractors/materialment; also see Transcript dated June 11,
1987, hereinafter referred to as Tr. 3, page 151, lines 19-25,
page 152, lines 1-14).
The issue of lost bonding capacity is directly related
to "FLP's" negligent payment of contract amounts to "MI" before
the verifications of completion and delivers were accomplished by
"FLP". "FLP" had a duty to materialmen to make payments to "MI"
only as scheduled in the contract between "FLP" and "MI", (see D40; see also Tr. 2, page 128, lines 23-25, pages 129-134; see
also Tr. 2, page 136, lines 20-25).
There was a definite obligation and duty imposed by the
contract (D-40) upon "FLP" to make payments to the contractor in
a specif manner, (see D-40, sections 20.1 and section 23).
Astro",

not

a party

to the

contract, was damaged, non-

economically, by "FLP's" breach of those contractual provisions
on payment that created a duty of due care toward third-party
beneficiaries such as "Astro". As a direct and proximate result
of "FLP's" breach of duty to "Astro", "Astro" ended up being a
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Judgment debtor to their supplier and consequently lost their
bonding capacity which precluded "Astro" from even bidding the
types of jobs they had previously been able to bid when they had
their bond. The loss of the bond itself is a non-economic injury
resulting

directly

from

"FLP's"

failure to adhere to the

safeguards for payment set forth in "FLP's" contract with "MI".
The fact of the matter is that "FLP" paid out the full contract
amount to "MI" without verifying deliveries of materials or
adhereing to the contractual safeguards that would have protected
"Astro",

(see Transcript dated June 16, 1987, hereinafter

referred to as Tr. 4, page 165, lines 19-25, pages 166-176 to
line 22). It is further clear from the testimony of Mr. Tom Mace,
employee of

"FLP" and the only person authorized

to make

payments, that Mr. Mace approved payments to "MI" without regard
for the duty of verified payemnts to protect "Astro" and other
parties not parties to the "FLP"/"MI" contract. It is also clear
that Mr. Mace approved the final, full contract amount payment to
"MI" when the marina was only about 30% completed, (see Tr. 4,
page 186, lines 8-19, page 204, lines 17-25, page 205, lines 14).
The negligent payment issue is a cause of action in
negligence when the contractual provisions establish a duty owed
to someone not a party to the contract. All that need be shown to
give a basis for the negligence action is to find the duty. This
is true even though the relationship comes out of a contractual
relationship, (see W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, 4th Ed. 1971,
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Section 93; D.C.R., Inc. v. Peak Alarm Company, 663 P. 2d 433
(Utah 1983); Meece v. Brigham Young University, 639 P.2d 720
(Utah 1981); and, Williams v. City of North Las Veags, 541 P.2d
652 (Nev. 1975). Once the duty is established, the plaintiff must
proceed to prove the breach of duty, proximate cause, and
damages.
Judge Hanson did not allow "Astro" to present further
evidence on the negligent payment issue as a result of his Rule
41B ruling. Judge Hanson made his Rule 41B ruling based upon his
erronious belief that there was no cause of action stated for
negligent payment, (see Judge Hanson's Ruling dated June 16,
1987, Record on Appeal page number 000647), even though the
Complaint in Intervention clearly sets forth the negligent
payment cause, (see Record on Appeal, Complaint in Intervention,
page numbers 000096 through 000101, specifically, page 000098,
paragraph 8; see also, Record on Appeal, Intervener's Trial
Brief, pages 000474 through 000479).
Judge Hanson erred in dismissing the negligence cause
based both on his erronious conclusion that there was not a cause
stated for negligent payment and that there were no non-economic
damages stated by "Astro".

ARGUMENT
II
The general rule in third-party beneficiary law in both
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Nevada and Utah is that third-party beneficiaries are subject to
the defenses that would be available as between the parties to
the contract* (see Britton v. Groom, 373 P.2d 1012 (Okla. 1962).
The Nevada Court cited the Britton case in Morelli v. Morelli,
720 P. 2d 704 (Nev. 1986) and determined that that general rule
is not always applicable. The Morelli case was a domestic
relations case wherein a child, upon reaching majority, could
enforce a contract as a third-party beneficiary even though the
father asserted a defense based upon the former wife's nonperformance. The

former wife had passed

away. The Court

determined that since the former wife was dead, it was impossible
for her to perform under the contract. Morelli thus held that the
general rule of the third-party beneficiary stepping into the
shoes of the parties to the contract is not applicable in all
cases. If the third-party beneficiary, or the original party to
the contract couldn't perform or it was impossible for those
parties to perform under the contract, the general rule cannot
apply.
In the instant case "Astro" couldn't perform because it
was a materialman only and had no expertise, knowledge or license
to complete the contract, i.e., build the jroarina. "Astro merely
supplied a small portion of the materials required to build the
marina. Further it is obvious from the testimony of Milt Taylor,
"Astrofs" president, that he was not under any time frame for
delivery of the steel product and did not even know of any time
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frame set forth in the "FLP"/"MI" contract as he was not a party
to it nor in privity with "FLP" or "MI" concerning the contract,
"Astro" was merely a third-party beneficiary to the payment
provisions of the "FLP"/"MI" contract.

"FLP" misconstrues the meaning of material breach when
it

suggests

performance.

that
(see

"Mi's"

material

Lagrange

Corporation, 429 P.2d

breach

relieves

Construction,

Inc.

it of

v.

Kent

58, 59 (Nev. 1967); and, Cladianos v.

Friedhoff, 240 P.2d 208, (Nev. 1952). The real issue on breach is
that "FLP" failed to properly verify payments to "MI" in breach
of its contractual obligation and contractually created duty to
"Astro" when it made full contractual payment to "MI" prior to
the project being completed, or more importantly to "Astro",
before "Astro had even delivered the last load of steel product
to the site. This "FLP" breach was a material breach that
occurred before any material by "MI" and "FLP's" breach precluded
"Astro" from getting paid.
The law in Nevada is liberal in allowing recovery to
third-party beneficiaries under third-party beneficiary theory,
(see "Astrofs" Trial Brief, Record on Appeal, page numbers 000451
through 000484, specifically, pages 000455 through 000463).
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The facts, through testimony and exhibits, adduced at
trial, before the Honorable Judge Hanson's Rule 41B ruling,
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illustrate that "Astro" had plead and started to prove the
elements of a negligence cause of action based upon "FLP's"
negligent payment of contract funds to the general contractor,
"MI", prior to verified completion. (The project being only about
30% completed when Mr. Mace of "FLP" authorized payment of the
full contract amount to "MI"). The Honorable Judge Hanson erred
by dismissing the negligence cause of "Astto" in his ruling of
June 16, 1987 on "FLP's" Ru;e 41B Motion.
The case should be remanded to the District Court on
the issue of negligent payment as plead by "Astro". "Astro"
should be allowed to finish aducing evidehce to establish its
cause of action in negligence.

The Honorable Judge Hanson ruled in his July 1, 1987
Ruling that "Astro" proved its case on third-party beneficiary
theory but that all damages proved were dffset because of the
defenses

available

to

"FLP". Judge Hanson

erred

in his

application of the law of third-party beneficiary, as "Astro" is
not subject to all the defenses "FLP" might have against "MI".
"Astro", as only a materialman, does not have the ability to
complete the marina, thus making it an impossibility to perform
as the general contractor should have performed. In such factual
situations the third-party beneficiary does not step into the
shoes of the contractor for all purposes. "Astro" did not pick
and choose the provisions of the contract
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(the

"FLP"/MI"

contract) that it felt beneficial to it, but rather choose to
enforce its limited third-party rights as provided under the
contract. Those limited rights were established by "FLP" and
benefitted were designed to benefit, in this case, "Astro" only
with regard to payment assurances.
"Astro" respectfully

represents that the trial

court's ruling of no cause based upon the offsets as applied to
"Astro" should be reversed and Judgment entered for "Astro" in
the amount of $101,300.00 as supported by the evidence, together
with prejudgment interest, as set forth in the Record on Appeal,
page numbers 000606 through 000614, specifically page 000611
paragraph 23.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of June, 1988.

f J. Ray Barria&, PTC.
y Attorney for{Astro Steel Corporation
V_Piaantiff/In"c:^rvenor-Appellant
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